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PARTIES TO THIS ACTION
THE APPELLANT
The Appellant in this action is Hartford Leasing Corporation
who is the owner of a commercial building situated in the City of
Moab, Grand County, State of Utah.
THE APPELLEES
Appellee State of Utah entered into a leasing agreement with
the Appellant to lease space in Appellant's commercial building
in the City of Moab, Grand County, State of Utah.
Appellee Rio Vista Oil Company, is a Utah Corporation which
operates in the City of Moab, Grand County, State of Utah a gas
station known as Moab U-Serve and also known as Stars Food Store.
Appellee La Sal Oil Company is a Utah Corporation which
operates in the City of Moab, Grand County, State of Utah, a gas
station known as Gordon's Sinclair.
Defendant Dependable Janitorial Service has been dismissed
from this action.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The specific statutory authority that confers jurisdiction
in this Court in this matter is 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Annotated,
1993.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE No. 1:

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by

accepting and ruling on the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss when the
Appellees' failed to comply with the Notice provisions of Rule 4506(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration?

The standard

of review is whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by
failing to comply with the Code of Judicial Administration.
Sperrv v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 1984).
ISSUE No. 2:

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by

granting the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute?

The standard of review is whether the Trial Court

abused its discretion in granting the Appellees' Motion to
Dismiss.

Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740

P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah
1987).
ISSUE No. 3:

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in

granting the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute the action when the Appellant had engaged new counsel
who had reactivated this litigation?

The standard of review is

whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in granting the
Appellees' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute.
1

Country

Meadow Convalescent Center v. Utah Department of Health, 851 P.2d
1212, 1216 (Utah App. 1993).
ISSUE No. 4:

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in

granting the Appellees' Motion with Prejudice.

The standard of

review is whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in
granting the Appellees' Motion with Prejudice.

Charlie Brown

Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App.
1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
ISSUE No. 5:

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by

failing to hold a hearing on the Appellees' Motions to Dismiss
when a hearing was requested by the Appellant pursuant to Rule 4501(3)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

The

standard of review is whether the Trial Court abused its
discretion.

Gillmor v. Cummincrs, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah App. 1991) .

ISSUE No. 6:

Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in

interpreting Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration when it decided that Rule 4-501 did not permit the
submission of Supplemental Memorandum which resulted in the Court
failing to consider the Appellant's supplemental memorandum when
deciding upon Appellees' Motions to Dismiss.

The standard of

review is to pay no deference to the legal conclusions of the
lower court. Bettinger v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah App.
1990) .
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are reproduced in full
and attached hereto in Appendix A:
2

Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 4-506, Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 103-3, Rules of Practice for the Federal District Court
for the District of Utah
Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1993)
Section 286, California Code of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal is being taken from an Order of the Seventh
Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah,
dated and entered on the 21st day of June, 1993, and signed by
Judge Lyle R. Anderson, over the objections of the Appellant,
granting the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss with prejudice for
Failure to Prosecute. (R. 173-176 and R. 313-316).

The notice of

appeal was filed on the 3rd day of August, 1993 pursuant to Rule
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FACTUAL HISTORY
1.

This action was filed on June 22, 1988.

(R. 1-14).

2.

The Plaintiff, as the owner of a building in Moab, Utah

known as the Southwest Regional Center, brought action against
the State of Utah for vacating the building prior to the
expiration of the lease and against Defendant LaSal Oil and Rio
Vista Oil for damages to its property occasioned by leakage of
gasoline from underground storage tanks which were alleged to
have created an underground plume, which invaded Plaintiff's and
adjoining property owners land. (R. 1-14).
3

3.

Appellee Rio Vista filed its answer on July 18, 1988.

(R. 29-32) .
4.

Default Judgment was entered against Appellee La Sal on

July 26, 1988.
5.

(R. 37).

Appellee State of Utah filed a Motion for a More

Definite Statement on August 25, 1988.
6.

(R. 41-43).

The Trial Court granted Appellee State's Motion for a

More Definite Statement on September 27, 1988.
7.

(R. 52).

On November 15, 1988 Appellant's counsel William Bannon

executed a notice of withdrawal as counsel, which was not filed
with the Trial Court until December 8, 1988.
8.

(R. 67).

On November 30, 1988, attorney Dale Gardner prepared a

Notice of Appearance as Appellant's attorney.

However, said

Notice does not anywhere appear in the Court's record.
9.

On December 1, 1988, Counsel for Appellant prepared but

never signed nor filed Appellant's Amended Complaint in response
to Appellee State's Motion for a More Definite Statement.

(R.

242-254).
10.

The Plaintiff filed for protection from it's creditors

under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on December 1, 1988.
11.

On December 6, 1988, Appellant and Appellee La Sal Oil

stipulated to set aside the default judgment entered against
Appellee La Sal.
12.

(R. 57-59).

On December 7, 1988, the Trial Court issued an Order

setting aside the Default judgment entered against Appellee La
Sal.

(R. 60-61) .
4

13.

Appellee La Sal filed its answer on December 7, 1988.

(R. 62-65) .
14.

On December 30, 198 8, Appellant's Counsel Dale Gardner

filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel and Notice of Bankruptcy
which informed the Trial Court that the Appellant had filed a
petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection.
15.

Appellant's Bankruptcy petition was closed on October

29, 1990.
16.

(R. 69).

(R. 128).
At no time did any of the Appellees file a Notice to

Appoint Counsel or Appear in Person pursuant to Rule 4-506 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

(R. 219-220 and R. 175-

176) .
17.

Despite being forced into Bankruptcy by Appellees' own

conduct, Appellant continued to pursue this litigation by
obtaining, through the non-record discovery process, hundreds of
relevant documents and several environmental reports.

(R. 221-

239) .
18.

Despite being forced into Bankruptcy by the Appellee's

own conduct, Appellant unsuccessfully tried to retain other
counsel who would represent Appellant in this litigation to its
conclusion.
19.

(R. 256-286).

Appellees La Sal and Rio Vista have been involved as

parties in collateral litigation in the Seventh Judicial District
Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah under case
#880705660 and said case dealt with their culpability for damages
to adjoining property owners occasioned by a gas plume which
5

invaded property abutting the Appellant's land.
20.

(R. 296-308).

Appellees La Sal, Rio Vista and the State have been

involved as parties in litigation in the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County and said case dealt with the issue of
whether or not a gas plume from La Sal and/or Rio Vista invaded
Appellant's and/or other neighboring properties and who should be
responsible for costs of remediation expended by the state.

(R.

115-116) .
21.

Both of these case were concluded just prior to the

filing of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
22.

(R. 116).

Each of the Appellees were actively involved in the

prosecution and defense of those cases and many scientific
studies were produced on both sides to prove issues between them.
These studies were conducted on the Appellant's property as well
as the property of others.
23.

(R. 116).

On March 29, 1993, despite having not complied with

Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Appellee
State filed its Motion to For Lack of Prosecution or Strike and
Points and Authorities.
24.

(R. 71-75).

On March 31, 1993, despite having not complied with

Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Appellee
La Sal filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.

(R.

76-105).
25.

On April 12, 1993, Appellant's new counsel, Steven C.

Tycksen filed his Notice of Appearance of Counsel.
26.

(R. 106).

On April 12, 1993, Appellant's new counsel, Steven C.
6

Tycksen. filed a Request for Scheduling pursuant to Rule 16(b).
(R. 108).
27.

On April 12, 1993, Appellant's new counsel, Steven C.

Tycksen, without adequate time to evaluate the factual
underpinnings of this complicated environmental litigation,
prepared and submitted Objections to Defendants' Motion for
Dismissal including a request for Oral Argument pursuant to Rule
4-501(3)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (R. 112)
and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
28.

(R. 110-125) .

On April 21, 1993, Appellee La Sal submitted its Reply

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.
(R. 126-135).
29.

On April 21, 1993, Appellee State filed its Reply

Regarding Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution with
Prejudice or Strike.
30.

(R. 136-139).

On May 3, 1993, Appellee Rio Vista filed a Motion for

Joinder in Motions to Dismiss.
31.

(R. 140).

On May 24, 1993, Appellant filed a Supplemental

Affidavit in Support of its Objections to the Motions to Dismiss.
(R. 142-146) .
32.

On June 7, 1993, Appellee La Sal filed a Notice to

Submit for Decision.
33.

(R. 147-148).

On June 7, 1993, Appellant filed a Supplemental

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.
34.

(R. 151-162).

On June 8, 1993, Appellant filed a Notice to Submit for
7

Decision.
35.

(R. 149-150).
On June 14, 1993, Appellee La Sal filed its Motion and

Memorandum to Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.
36.

(R. 163-166).
On June 16, 1993, Appellee State filed its Motion and

Memorandum to Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.
37.

(R. 170-172).
On June 21, 1993, Judge Lyle R. Anderson, without

holding oral argument as requested by Appellant pursuant to Rule
4-501(3) (b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, entered
a minute entry ruling on the Motions to Dismiss.
38.

(R. 173-176) .

A proposed Order based on the ruling was mailed to the

Court on July 7, 1993 with an unsigned and undated mailing
certificate.
39.

On July 15, 1993, at 4:59 p.m., Appellant via facsimile

transmission submitted its Objection to proposed Order and a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Objections
to the proposed Order.

(R. 177-196).

The court nonetheless time

stamped the document as received July 16, 1993. (R. 177).
40.

).

On July 15, 1993, and without holding oral argument as

requested by Appellant pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(b) of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration, Judge Lyle R. Anderson signed an
Order of Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution with Prejudice
submitted by Appellee State.

(R. 167-169).
8

41.

A hard copy of Appellant's Objections to the Proposed

Order and Memorandum of Points and Authorities was filed with the
Trial Court on July 16, 1993.
42.

(R. 197-312).

On July 19, 1993, Judge Lyle R. Anderson entered his

Ruling on Objections to Proposed Order through which he confirmed
his earlier order granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss For
Failure to Prosecute with Prejudice.
43.

(R. 313-315).

From the foregoing, Appellant filed its Notice of

Appeal and Cost Bond.

(R. 316-319).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Trial Court abused its discretion by proceeding in
this matter despite its acknowledgement that the Appellees failed
to comply with the terms of Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.

The Trial Court abused its discretion

by granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss because Appellant did
not engage in dilatory conduct worthy of such a dismissal.

The

Trial Court further abused its discretion in granting the
Appellees' Motions to Dismiss where Appellant had engaged new
counsel who had reactivated the case.

The Trial Court abused its

discretion by failing to hold the hearing and oral argument
requested by the Appellant pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration.

Finally, the Trial Court erred

as a matter of law in interpreting Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.
Because the Trial Court abused its discretion, and to right
the injustice that has resulted from that abuse, this Court must
9

vacate the Trial Court's decision and remand this case to the
Trial Court for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ACCEPTING AND
RULING ON THE APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS WHEN THE
APPELLEES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF
RULE 4-506(3) OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.

A.

Rule 4-506 (3)
It is axiomatic that a party must comply with the rules

contained in the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Specifically, in the present case, Appellees filed their Motions
to Dismiss in violation of Rule 4-506(3) of the Code of Judicial
Administration.

Further, upon filing the filing of the

Appellees' Motions to Dismiss, the Trial Court did not require
the Appellee's to comply with the terms of Rule 4-506(3).
Because the Trial Court held proceedings in this case despite its
own recognition of the Appellees' noncompliance with the Code of
Judicial Administration (R. 175), the Trial Court abused its
discretion.

Therefore, this Court should reverse the Trial

Court's granting of the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss.
- Appellees violated Rule 4-506 of the Code of Judicial
Administration.

Rule 4-506(3) states

(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or
withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an attorney,
opposing counsel must notify, in writing, the unrepresented
client of his responsibility to retain another attorney or
appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate
further proceedings against the client. A copy of the
written notice shall be filed with the court and no further
proceedings shall be held in the matter until 2 0 days have
elapsed from the date of filing.
Rule 4-506(3), Code of Judicial Administration (emphasis added).
10

Thus, the rule contains a mandatory proscription against any
further proceedings in an action until twenty days have elapsed
following the date of filing the notice to obtain counsel or
appear.

The express language of the Rule precludes any exercise

of discretion by the Trial Court with respect to whether a party
must comply with the terms of the Rule.
Appellees violated Rule 4-506(3) by failing to serve
Appellant with notice to obtain counsel or appear.

The Trial

Court abused its discretion by granting Appellees' Motion to
Dismiss in light of their respective violations of the Code of
Judicial Administration.

In Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah

1984), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the question of whether a
trial court abused its discretion in granting a party's Motion
for Summary Judgment when the moving party failed to comply with
the predecessor to Rule 4-506.

In Sperry, the court said,

Since the judgment was entered after the failure of the
court to follow one of its own rules, we conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion.
Sperry at 582.

The present case is analogous to Sperry.

In

Sperry, the attorney did not comply with the predecessor to Rule
4-506 (no Notice to Appear in Person or Obtain Counsel was mailed
to the other party).

As in Sperry, in the present case, counsel

for the Appellees did not send notification to the Appellant of
the need to obtain counsel or appear.
The Trial Court abused its discretion because it clearly
found that the Appellees failed to comply with Rule 4-506(3), yet
nonetheless accepted and ruled on Appellees Motion to Dismiss.
11

In its Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, this Court expressly
stated that the Appellees failed to comply with the rule when
counsel for Hartford Leasing withdrew from the case.
176).

(R. 175-

Yet in spite of this admission of noncompliance, the Judge

Lyle R. Anderson granted Appellees' Motion to Dismiss.
The Trial Court abused its discretion because it erroneously
created its own remedy for noncompliance with Rule 4-506 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

In its ruling, the Trial

Court stated that "the remedy for such a failure is not
necessarily denial of the motion.

The remedy is to grant

Hartford sufficient time after a pleading is filed in violation
of Rule 4-506 to obtain counsel and adequately respond.

It is

evident here that Hartford has had that opportunity." (R. 175176).

The Trial Court's ruling is an abuse of discretion because

it both ignores the plain language of the Rule and creates its
own remedy which does not follow the precedent established in
Utah and other jurisdictions.
The Trial Court's ruling on this matter is an abuse of
discretion because it ignores the express language of the Rule
which precludes the filing of any further proceedings against the
party until such time as the notice is provided.

Rule 4-506 does

not vest the Trial Court with the discretion to permit
proceedings despite noncompliance with the rule.

In Sperrv,

supra, the Trial Court accepted a Motion for Summary Judgment,
heard the matter and granted the Motion despite noncompliance

12

with the then existing version of Rule 4-506.x

Sperry at 583.

In Sperry, the Utah Supreme Court said, "Since the judgment was
entered after the failure of the court to follow one of its own
rules, we conclude that the Trial Court abused its discretion."
Sperry at 583.
case.

This is precisely what occurred in the present

The Trial Court accepted and ruled upon Appellees' Motions

to Dismiss despite its express admission that Appellees failed to
comply with Rule 4-506.

(R. 175-176).

Thus, the Trial Court

abused its discretion.
The Trial Court abused its discretion in creating its own
remedy which both ignored the express language of the rule and
precedent.

The Trial Court stated

the remedy for such a failure is not necessarily denial of
the motion. The remedy is to grant Hartford sufficient time
after a pleading is filed in violation of Rule 4-506 to
obtain counsel and adequately respond. It is evident here
that Hartford has had that opportunity.
(R. 175-176).
discretion.

The Trial Court's statement is an abuse of
First, as mentioned above, the rule expressly states

that no further proceedings shall be held until twenty days after
the required notice has been given.
Judicial Administration (1993).

See Rule 4-506, Utah Code of

Thus, the Trial Court abused its

discretion in holding proceedings before such notice was filed.
1

Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts of
the State of Utah, in the relevant part, stated, "When an attorney
dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from the case or
ceases to act as an attorney, the party to an action for whom such
attorney was acting, must before any further proceedings as had
against him, be required by the adverse party, by written notice to
appoint another or to appear in person." Rule 2.5 of the Rules of
Practice of the District Courts of the State of Utah as quoted in
Sperry at 582.
13

Second, the appropriate remedy is expressly set forth in the Rule
itself, i.e.; to not hold any further proceedings until
compliance with the rule is satisfied.

In Sperrv, the Utah

Supreme Court said, "the trial judge should have required
plaintiff's attorney to then give notice . . .

in accordance with

Rule 2.5 before proceeding to hear and grant the motion."

Sperrv

at 582.
Utah is not alone in its interpretation that the appropriate
remedy for failure to comply with such Rules is to require the
noncomplying party to comply prior to holding any further
proceedings.

California, in its Code of Civil Procedure, has a

provision which is similar to Utah"s 4-506.2

In McMunn v.

Lehrke, 155 P. 473, 476 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 1915), the court held
that where the court set a matter for trial and held the trial in
the absence of the adverse party providing notice to the
unrepresented party, the court was without the authority to hold
a trial in this matter.

In McMunn, the court stated, "It seems

to us that the court was without the authority to proceed with
the trial.

We are further of the opinion that, if it was within

the discretion of the court so to proceed, it was, under all the
circumstances, an abuse of discretion."

McMunn at 477.

In Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co., 170 Cal. App.

2

Section 286, C.C.P. states, "When an attorney dies, or is
removed or suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to an
action, for whom he was acting as attorney, must, before any
further proceedings are had against him, be required by the adverse
party, by written notice, to appoint another attorney, or to appear
in person."
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3d 725, 216 Cal. Rptr. 300, (Cal App. 2 Dist. 1985) the
California courts again addressed the question of whether it was
an abuse of discretion to hold proceedings in the face of
noncompliance with C.C.P. §286.

In Aldrich, the court said

Section 286 means what it plainly says, 'that no proceedings
may be had against him [the now unrepresented party] no
judgment or order or other step in the action taken, until
he appoints an attorney, unless the prescribed notice be
first given.' [citing to Larking v. Superior Court, 171
Cal. 719, 154 P. 841 (1916)]. The term *proceedings', used
in its technical legal sense, refers to something done or to
be done in a court of justice or before a judicial officer,
[citing to Lister v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d 64, 70,
159 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1979)]. A motion in the superior court
to dismiss an action for want of prosecution is a good
illustration of what is meant by the term proceeding.
Aldrich at 310 [emphasis supplied].

In both McMunn and Aldrich,

the appellate courts vacated the judgments and remanded the case
back to the trial courts for further proceedings.

Thus, the

California courts make it clear that a Motion to Dismiss is a
proceeding included under the scope of a statute similar to
Utah's 4-506 and that it is an abuse of discretion for the Trial
Court to hold such proceedings in the absence of the required
notice.

Similarly, this Court should vacate the judgment granted

by the Trial Court because the Trial Court abused its discretion.
B.

Gardiner's Notice of Withdrawal
Appellees' raised arguments to the Trial Court, with which

the Trial Court apparently agreed, stating that Appellant's
previous attorney's Notice for Withdrawal relieved Appellees of
their burden to comply with Rule 4-506(3) of the Code of Judicial
Administration. (R. 127). As the language of Rule 4-506 makes
clear, compliance with the rule is mandatory.
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There was never an

appearance in this case by any other counsel for or on behalf of
Appellant until its current counsel filed a Notice of Appearance
in April of 1993. (R.

115). Clearly, the Appellees were not in

any way relieved of their burden to comply with this rule.

Thus,

the Trial Court abused its discretion in both accepting and
granting Appellees' Motion to Dismiss.
Appellees failure to comply with Rule 4-506(3) was both in
violation of the Code of Judicial Administration and
unreasonable.

The Trial Court erroneously excused the Appellees

from the requirements of Rule 4-506(3) of the Code of Judicial
Administration because the Notice of Withdrawal was allegedly
ambiguous.

(R.

175). However, upon a careful review of the

notice (R. 69), it is apparent that the notice did not contain
any information which would relieve the Defendants' of their
burden to comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 4-506.
Specifically, the Withdrawal of Counsel and Notice of
Bankruptcy contains two paragraphs.

The first paragraph clearly

states that Dale F. Gardiner was withdrawing as counsel in the
present case.

The second paragraph states

NOTICE is also given that on December 1, 1988, Hartford
Leasing Corporation filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Utah. Counsel for Hartford Leasing Corporation is George H.
Speciale Esq., 5 Triad Center #585, Salt Lake City, Utah
84180.
See

Exhibit 1.

Clearly, the fact that naming Mr. Speciale as

counsel for Hartford Leasing is contained in the same paragraph
which informs the defendants of Hartford Leasing's filing a
petition for bankruptcy indicates that Mr. Speciale was counsel
16

for Hartford Leasing in the bankruptcy proceeding.

The World

Book Encyclopedia, defines "paragraph" as "a division of written
work, consisting of one or more sentences, all related to the
same idea."

World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, Field Enterprises,

Inc. (1957).3
The Notice of Withdrawal contains two separate paragraphs
which clearly relate to two separate subject matters.

Paragraph

one simply informs the parties of Mr. Gardner's withdrawal as
counsel for the Appellant.

Paragraph two contains two sentences

both of which related to Appellant's filing bankruptcy.

Had the

notice intended to convey that Mr. Speciale was counsel for the
Appellant in the present matter, the reference to him would have
obviously been placed in the first paragraph.

Any other reading

of this notice is both twisted and plainly erroneous.
Mr. Speciale never filed a notice of appearance in this case
with this court.

While the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not

contain a rule which expressly requires a Notice of Appearance4
3

See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, defining paragraph
as "a subdivision of a written composition that consists of one or
more sentences, deals with one point or gives the words of one
speaker and begins on a new usually line. See also The Harbrace
College Handbook, Chapter 32, stating, "An essential unit of
thought in writing, the paragraph usually consists of a group of
related sentences . . . . In a unified paragraph, each sentence
contributes to developing a central idea." The Harbrace College
Handbook, Chapter 32, pp. 311-313, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Publishers, 1986 and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 6th Edition (defining
paragraph as a distinct part of a discourse or writing; any section
or subdivision of writing or chapter which relates to particularly
points, whether consisting of one or many sentences).
4

Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in the
relevant part, states, "Every pleading and other paper filed with
the court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and
17

be filed, it is the understood practice of attorneys to file such
Notices in cases where the attorney has replaced withdrawn
counsel or to appeal generally in court or by filing a pleading.
None of those things were ever done by Mr. Speciale in the State
Court.
Further, while the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not
contain an express rule requiring a Notice of Appearance, the
Federal Rules of Practice of the United States District Court do
contain such a rule.

Rule 103-3 (a) of the Rule of Practice for

the Federal District Court, in the relevant part, states
If an attorney's appearance has not been established
previously by the filing of papers in the action or
proceeding, such attorney shall file with the clerk a
notice of appearance promptly upon undertaking the
representation of any party or witness in any court or
grand jury proceeding.
Rule 103-3 (a), Rules of Practice for the Federal District Court
(1992) .

Thus, while the Rules of Practice are not binding on the

State District courts, they do codify what has become the
standard industry practice for attorneys who take over
representation of a client after the withdrawal of previous
counsel.
Appellees' failure to comply with Rule 4-506(3) of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration was not reasonable nor should it

bar number of any attorney representing the party filing the paper,
which information shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the
first page." Rule 10, U.R.C.P. (1992). It should be noted that
many of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are copied exactly or
patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 10,
U.R.C.P. is similar to Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Compiler's Note following Rule 10, U.R.C.P.
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be excused.

The Trial Court's decision to excuse noncompliance

with this Rule effectively stated that the withdrawing counsel
has the right to name any other attorney as a replacement
(whether the same is true or not) and opposing parties are then
excused from the requirements of the Rule.

Such an

interpretation is strictly contrary to the very purpose for which
the Rule was enacted, protecting unrepresented parties from the
harsh results which can occur as a result of that lack of
representation.

Withdrawing counsel is not and should not be

vested with the authority to notify the court of replacement
counsel.

Further, nothing short of a notice of appearance from

replacement counsel relieves the Defendants' from their
affirmative duty to file with the Court and serve the Appellant
with a Notice to Obtain Counsel or Appear as required by Rule 4506 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Because the Appellees failed to comply with the provisions
of Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and
because the Trial Court held proceedings in this matter despite
that noncompliance, the Trial Court abused its discretion.
Therefore this Court must vacate the decision of the Trial Court
and remand this case to the Trial Court for further proceedings.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.
The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Appellees'

Motion to Dismiss because the factors which that court must
consider favor denying Appellees' motion.

In Maxfield v.

Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989), this Court stated
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There is more to consider in determining if dismissal for
failure to prosecute is proper than merely the amount of
time elapsed since the suit was filed. The factors which we
consider include the following: (1) the conduct of both
parties; (2) the opportunity which each party has had to
move the case forward; (3) what each party has done to move
the case forward; (4) what difficulty or prejudice may have
been caused to the other side; and (5) most important,
whether injustice may result from the dismissal.
Maxfield at 239, citing K.L.C., Inc. v. McLean, 656 P.2d 986, 988
(Utah 1982) .
L,

THE CONDUCT OF BOTH PARTIES.

The first factor, the conduct of both parties, after
considering the record and informal discovery by the Appellant,
weighs heavily to conclude that the only party who has made any
effort to bring this case to fruition is the Appellant.

On the

record alone, the Appellant filed a complaint in June of 1988.
(R. 1-15) .

The Appellees responded the shortly thereafter.

29-33; 41-42; and 62-65).
the record.

(R.

Nothing more of substance appears on

Thus, on the record, both parties pursued or appear

to be dilatory in this action with equal vigor.

However, does

not reflect all of the activity on the case.
Dismissal with prejudice was inappropriate in this case.

In

its ruling of June 21, 1993, the Trial Court stated that "between
December 30, 1988 and March 29, 1993, Hartford has done nothing
to move this case forward."

(R. 174).

If that were in fact the

case, then perhaps dismissal with prejudice would be justified in
this case.

Admittedly, the docket report for this case reflects

a complete lack of activity to prosecute or defend this case by
any party.

(R. 217-220).

In fact, there are not entries on the
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docket at all from June 22, 1988 to March 29, 1993.
220).

(R. 219-

However, the record does not accurately reflect the

activities of any of the parties in either prosecuting or
defending this action.
Appellant has diligently prosecuted this case from the date
the case was filed to the present.

The factual basis for

Appellant's claims against Appellees Rio Vista and La Sal were
the basis of numerous studies by governmental agencies
surrounding an environmental waste discharge.

Appellant

diligently pursued this action through vigorously pursuing nonnon-record discovery from governmental agencies and private
entities who were not parties to this litigation.

(R. 221-239) .

From the date of filing the Complaint through the end of
November 1988, Plaintiff's counsel Dale Gardiner actively pursued
this litigation through record discovery (responding to
interrogatories and attending depositions) and non-record
discovery (seeking information about the source of the injuries
suffered by Hartford Leasing from persons and entities who were
not parties to this litigation).
Dale Gardiner filed a notice of withdrawal as counsel and
Notice of Bankruptcy on December 26, 1988.

(R. 69). However,

prior to that date, and in response to this Court granting
Defendant State of Utah's Motion for a More Definite Statement,
Gardiner drafted an Amended Complaint.

(R. 242-255).

Unbeknownst to the Appellant and for reasons that Appellant can
only speculate as to, Gardiner failed to file the Amended
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Complaint or otherwise notify Appellant that he had failed to do
so.
Appellant continued to actively pursue the case from
December of 1988 through October of 1990.

During this period of

time, Appellant was under the protection of the bankruptcy court
because it filed a petition for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
as a result of the economic stress which occurred to it as a
result of the Appellee State of Utah vacating the building and
also as a result of the gas plume which occurred due to leaking
underground storage tanks allegedly owned by the other Appellees
to this action who were abutting property owners.

(R. 69).

In

October of 1990, Appellant's bankruptcy petition was dismissed.
(R. 128).

From December 1988 through October 1990, even if

Appellant had done nothing to prosecute this action, such failure
to prosecute would be protected under the United States
Bankruptcy code.
However, despite their pending bankruptcy,

Appellant

continued to exercise diligence in prosecuting this case.
Admittedly, most of the discovery activity which occurred during
this period of time was non-record discovery (such as obtaining
environmental reports from various governmental agencies or
private entities which evaluated the area to identify the source
of the gas plume which devaluated Appellant's building and
resulted in the State of Utah vacating the premises).
239).

(R. 221-

The mere fact that Appellant's activities were neither on

the record (as are notices of deposition, for example) nor
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directly involving an Appellee, does not mean that Appellant did
nothing to prosecute this case.

Appellant diligently

prosecuted this case by engaging in settlement negotiations.
Appellant was actively negotiating a settlement of this case with
the State of Utah during the period of time from June 1989
through December 1990.

(R. 236). Most courts which have

considered the question have held that it is improper to dismiss
with prejudice a case for failure to prosecute where the parties
have actively engaged in settlement negotiations.
Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977) and
Williams, 30 So.2d 522 (Fla 1947).

See e.g. Utah
Hazen v.

Thus, under the better

reasoned decisions, apparent delays in prosecuting a claim is not
grounds for dismissal with prejudice where the delays resulted in
significant part from settlement negotiations.

Therefore,

Appellant should be deemed to have actively and diligently
pursued this case up to December 1990.
Appellant diligently prosecuted this case from December of
1990 to the present.

Appellant retained counsel, actively

communicated with them and waited for retained counsel to
prosecute the case.

(R. 256-286).

Each time, the counsel

retained would either develop a conflict of interest which
precluded them from handling the complete case or would cease to
work on the matter once they realized that Appellant could not
pay the required hourly rate.

(R. 256-286).

In late December of 1992, Appellant consulted with present
counsel about the possibility of taking this case on a
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contingency.

Present counsel advised Appellant that after

reviewing the documents, if he felt that Appellant had a case, he
would accept the matter on a contingency fee basis.

In early

1993, Appellant entered into a contingency fee agreement with
their present counsel.

(R. 284-286).

Thus, Appellant continued

to diligently pursue this action from the date it was initially
filed.
2.

THE OPPORTUNITY EACH PARTY HAS HAD TO MOVE THE CASE
FORWARD.

The second factor, the opportunity each party has had to
move the case forward favors the Appellant because the Appellant
has had less opportunity to move this case forward than have the
Appellees.

In December of 1988, Counsel for Appellant filed a

Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel and Notice of Bankruptcy.

(R.

69).

Appellant filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

69).

Appellant was financially devastated as a direct result of

the injustices complained of in their complaint.

(R.

The property in

question experienced a gross devaluation, the tenants having
vacated caused Plaintiff's cash flow to dry up, and the Appellant
was materially threatened in its ability to survive let alone
prosecute this action.

During the pendency of that Bankruptcy

action, Appellant was unrepresented in this case as a matter of
the record.

Appellant required time to regroup and reorganize

its affairs so as to be able to properly prosecute its interests.
As a result of these difficulties, Appellant had little record
opportunity to move this case forward.

Nonetheless, and despite

its severe economic difficulties arising proximately from the
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Appellees' conduct, the Appellant has diligently pursued informal
discovery which is not reflected on the Court's docket and has
repeatedly retained counsel who have stayed on the case just long
enough to spend their retainer fees before discovering a
previously unknown conflict of interest.

In this case, Appellant

has done everything within its power to diligently prosecute this
case.

It has executed every practical opportunity afforded to it

to do so.
In contrast to Appellant's circumstances and efforts,
Appellees' remained represented by counsel.

Appellees' offered

no debilitating financial starts and had every opportunity to
continue to move this case forward and failed to avail themselves
of any of those opportunities.

Consequently, the second factor,

the opportunity each party had to move the case forward, favors
ruling against the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss.
3^

WHAT EACH PARTY HAS DONE TO MOVE THIS CASE FORWARD.

The third factor, what each party has actually done to move
this case forward, favors ruling against Appellees' on their
Motion to Dismiss.

Appellant was unrepresented by counsel, as a

matter of record, in this action from December 1988 until April
7, 1993 when Appellant's new counsel filed a Notice of
Appearance.

(R. 69 and 106). Appellant's delay in obtaining new

counsel to appear in the case related both to their bankruptcy
petition and the inability to retain counsel who would carry this
case to fruition in light of the Appellant's limited ability to
pay counsel's hourly fees.

(R. 256-286).
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However, Plaintiff did

continue consistency to gather discovery information and to
pursue obtaining counsel.

A summary of the activities in

chronological order is set forth in the record.
When Appellant obtained new counsel in this matter, Counsel
for Appellant immediately filed with the Trial Court a Request
for Scheduling Order.

(R. 108). Thus, as soon as Appellant

obtained new counsel who would carry this case to fruition based
on a contingency fee agreement, Appellant took steps to move this
case to a resolution.
In contrast to Appellant's excusable inability to move this
case forward, Appellees' have no excuse.

Appellees' failed to

move this case forward by filing the requisite Notice to Obtain
Counsel or Appear as required by Rule 4-506 of the Code of
Judicial Administration.

(R. 175). Further, Appellees' did

nothing to further this litigation other than take two
depositions and subpoena records held by one of the other
Appellees.

(R. 25-28; 38-39; 44-46; and 47-51).

Despite being

constantly represented by the same counsel throughout the period
of this litigation, Appellees never filed a certificate of
readiness for trial, did not request a scheduling order or move
to challenge the cause of action on the merits in summary
proceedings, nor did they do anything else to move this
litigation forward.

Thus, on balance, this factor favors the

Appellant and this court should rule that the trial court abused
its discretion in granting Appellees' Motion to Dismiss.
4.

WHAT DIFFICULTY OR PREJUDICE MAY HAVE OCCURRED TO THE
OTHER SIDE.
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The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Appellees'
Motions to Dismiss because Appellees have suffered no difficulty
or prejudice as a result of the alleged delays in this
litigation.

The Trial Court's Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss

states
The Defendants claim that they have suffered prejudice
because the passage of time has affected their ability to
gather evidence for the defense. The Court discounts some
of those claims because most of the Defendants have had the
opportunity and the incentive to gather much of the same
evidence in related matters. However, the Court recognizes
that witnesses become less available as time passes and that
some tests, particularly on carpeting, cannot be performed
now that the carpeting has been replaced.
(R. 175). The Trial Court's statement is an abuse of discretion
because the Appellees have not been prejudiced in this matter.
As noted above, Appellant has not delayed in bringing this
action to fruition.

Appellees have been actively involved in

litigation which is substantially similar to this litigation.
(R. 129; 296-304; and 305-308).

Both of these pieces of

litigation centered around the very same underground gas plume
leak which is the subject of this litigation.

All of the

litigation referred to herein has involved the issue of whether
or not there was a gas plume in the vicinity of the Moab Regional
Center, and whether it originated with La Sal Oil and/or Rio
Vista Oil facilities.

Extensive testing of the neighboring

properties as well as the Appellant's property in the Moab
Regional Center was done during these litigation efforts.

In the

related litigation, the Appellees were motivated to prove their
respective innocence by performing extensive expensive scientific
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studies which thereby preserved the factual record necessary to
defend themselves in this case.

In fact, as late as May 6, 1992,

Appellee La Sal and Rio Vista designated their respective expert
witnesses in these other cases.

Thus, contrary to the Trial

Court's statements, Appellees had no trouble obtaining witnesses
in 1992 and will not have trouble obtaining the same witnesses
now.

Appellee LaSal and Rio Vista's claims of prejudice are

without merit.
Appellee, State of Utah, will not be prejudiced insofar as
they were a party to one of the proceedings in which LaSal was
engaged.

The State held exhaustive administrative proceedings

against both Rio Vista and La Sal during which that Appellee
attempted to apportion liability for environmental clean up of
the Moab property damaged by Appellees La Sal and Rio Vista.
Appellant's claim against Appellee State is for breach of
contract.

The claim amounts to a statement that if the property

was not environmentally damaged, then the State is liable for
breach of their lease with Appellant.

If however, the property

is environmentally damaged, and the damage rendered the building
uninhabitable, the State is not liable for vacating the leased
premises prior to the expiration of the lease.
the State's defense is documentary in nature.

The majority of
Further, in

determining whether the building was environmentally damaged,
Appellee State has access to reports and studies performed by the
Department of Environmental Quality, EPA, OSHA and a multitude of
private consulting contractors who have investigated the site.
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Therefore, Appellee State has in no way been prejudiced by the
alleged delays in bringing this case to trial.
Further, the Trial Court abused its discretion by
determining without any evidence at all, that necessary tests on
the carpet could no longer be performed because the carpet had
been removed from the building.

The fact is that not one of the

Appellees' has requested access to the carpet to perform such
tests.

Appellant has had and still has the original carpet that

was removed from the building.

(R.

288-289).

The alleged

prejudice that the Appellees' would suffer could easily be
eliminated if merely one of the Appellees' had requested the
Appellant produce the carpet for testing.

Thus, the Trial Court

abused its discretion in assuming the existence of facts, which
not only were not in the record but were and are wholly untrue.
While none of the Appellees has in fact been prejudiced, the
action of the Trial Court was an abuse of discretion because it
constitutes the ultimate in prejudice to the Appellant who had a
justifiable excuse for the alleged delays in bringing this case
to trial.

As stated in Jepson v. New, 792 P.2d 728, 735 (Ariz

1990), "there can hardly be any prejudice than the complete loss
of a cause of action."

Thus, while the prejudice to the

Appellees' is at most minimal and in fact nonexistent, Appellant
has now endured the greatest possible prejudice.

Thus, balancing

the equities, the Trial Court abused its discretion in granting
Appellees' Motions to Dismiss.
5.

WHETHER INJUSTICE MAY RESULT FROM DISMISSAL.
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This final factor, considered to be the most important
factor, heavily favors the Appellant.

The Appellant has suffered

severe economic injuries as a result of the conduct of the
Appellees.

In fact, Appellant was forced to file bankruptcy as a

direct result of the injuries alleged against the Appellees.

It

would be grossly unjust to permit the alleged wrongdoers to
escape the possible consequences of their actions merely because
their actions were severe enough to economically ruin the
Appellant thereby financially precluding it from prosecuting this
case zealously on the record.

In order to right an extreme and

grave injustice, this Court should reverse the trial court's
granting of Appellees' Motion to Dismiss.
Appellant is entitled to its day in court.

In Westinqhouse

Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544
P.2d 876 (Utah 1975), the court said, "It is indeed commendable
to handle cases with dispatch and to move calendars forward with
expedition in order to keep them up to date.

But it is even more

important to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence
of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and
to do justice to them."

Westinqhouse at 878 [emphasis added].

As in Westinqhouse, this Court should recognize that the
Appellant has a right to be heard.

The Trial Court's decision

did handle this case with dispatch and thereby move its calendar
forward, but it did so by foreclosing a cause of action that the
Appellants have quietly and diligently pursued.

The Trial

Court's decision resulted in the ultimate injustice, denying the
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Appellant its day in court.

Further, the Trial Court's decision

came without any prior warning to the Appellant.

The Trial Court

did not issue an Order to Show Cause or in any other way warn the
Appellant that its allegedly dilatory conduct would result in
dismissal of this action.

Thus, this Court should vacate the

Trial Court's granting of Appellees' Motion to Dismiss which
thereby precluded Appellant from having their day in court
because the Trial Court abused its discretion in so ruling.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE
APPELLEES' MOTIONS TO DISMISS WHERE THE APPELLANT HAD
OBTAINED NEW COUNSEL WHO HAD REACTIVATED THIS CASE.
The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Appellees'
Motions to Dismiss with Prejudice for Failure to Prosecute this
action where the Appellant had obtained new counsel who obviously
had reactivated this case.

Because the Trial Court abused its

discretion, this Court must vacate the Trial Court's decision and
remand this case back to the Trial Court for further proceedings.
Utah case law is clear that it is an abuse of discretion to
grant a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to prosecute where the
party has obtained new counsel who has reactivated the case.

In

Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368, (Utah 1977), the Utah
Supreme Court considered a case wherein there was almost four
years of inactivity on the part of both the Plaintiff and the
Defendant.

In Johnson, the Plaintiff's inactive counsel withdrew

and new counsel made an appearance immediately prior to the trial
court's granting the Defendant's Motions to Dismiss for Failure
to Prosecute.

In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court said
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The conduct of all of the parties cannot be readily
explained; and in view of the fact that new counsel caused
the case to be activated, it seems that the trial court
abused its discretion in dismissing the case on a motion to
dismiss . . . .
Johnson at 1370.
Johnson is still the law in Utah.

As recently as April of

1993, in Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Department
of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Utah App. 1993), this Court cited
favorably to Johnson as standing for the proposition that it is
an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to grant a Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute where new counsel had been
obtained and had reactivated the case.

Country Meadows at 1216.

In the present case, the Trial Court abused its discretion
by granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute in light of the fact that Appellant had obtained new
counsel who had reactivated the case.

Appellant was without

counsel of record from December 1988 through April of 1993.

(R.

69 and 106). On April 16, 1993, when Appellant's new counsel
made his appearance on the record, Appellant's new counsel also
filed a Request for a Scheduling Conference.

(R. 108).

Appellant's new counsel was reactivating the case.

Clearly,

Thus, the

Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Appellees' Motions
to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute in light of the efforts of
Appellant's new counsel to reactivate this case.

Therefore, this

Court must vacate the Trial Court's decision and remand this case
for further proceedings in the Trial Court.
IV,

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE WITH
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PREJUDICE.
The Trial Court abused its discretion by granting Appellees'
Motions to Dismiss with Prejudice.

Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure in the relevant part, states
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or
for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P. (1993).

Thus, this Rule implies that the

Trial Court has the discretion to dismiss an action without
prejudice.
Utah case law recognizes that a dismissal with prejudice is
a severe sanction that should only be imposed where a party
neglects to prosecute an action without justifiable excuse.
Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Department of Health,
851 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Utah App. 1993).

In the present case, the

Appellant had a number of justifiable excuses for the record not
reflecting the activity in which it had engaged to bring this
action to trial.
The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting the
Appellees' Motions to Dismiss because it had lesser sanctions
available to it would have more fairly punished the Appellant for
the alleged delay in bringing this action to trial.

In Tolman v.

Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah App. 1991),
this Court defined an abuse of discretion as
By an as of discretion is meant a clearly erroneous
conclusion and judgment . . . It is a legal term to indicate
that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was a
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commission of error of law in the circumstances.
improvident exercise of discretion.

It is an

Tolman at 26-27.
In the present case, the Trial Court improvidently exercised
its discretion by granting the Appellees' Motions to Dismiss with
Prejudice.

The Trial Court had lesser sanctions available to it

which would have permitted the Appellant its day in court while
at the same time punishing it for its allegedly dilatory conduct.
The Trial Court could have made the Appellant pay the costs and
fees the Appellees' incurred in filing their Motions to Dismiss.
The Trial Court could have set a scheduling order and trial
designed to promptly resolve the matter.

Finally, the Trial

Court could have dismissed the action without prejudice.

Because

the Trial Court never warned the Appellant that its conduct might
lead to dismissal and the Appellant had a justifiable excuse for
the alleged delay in prosecuting this action, the Trial Court
could have and should have imposed a lessor sanction than
dismissal with prejudice upon the Appellant.

Therefore, the

Trial Court abused its discretion in granting the Appellees'
Motions to Dismiss with Prejudice.

Therefore, this Court must

vacate the Trial Court's decision and remand this case to the
Trial Court for further proceedings.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO HOLD A
HEARING PRIOR TO DECIDING APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS WHEN
THE APPELLANT REQUESTED SUCH A HEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 4501(3) (b) OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.
The Trial Court abused its discretion by granting Appellees'

Motions to Dismiss without holding a hearing and oral argument as
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requested by Hartford Leasing pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(b) of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

Thus, this Court must

vacate the Trial Court's decision and remand this case to the
Trial Court for further proceedings.
Rule 4-501(3)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration
states
In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the
action or any issues in the action on the merits with
prejudice, either party at the time of filing principal
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may
file a written request for a hearing
4-501(3) (b), U.C.A. (1993).

Appellant requested oral argument

its Objections to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. (R. 112).
The Trial Court was required to grant a request for a
hearing on the matter unless two narrow exceptions were present.
Rule 4-501(3)(c) states
Such a request shall be granted unless the court finds that
(a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous
or (b) that the dispositive issues governing the
granting or
denial of the motion has been
authoritatively decided.
Rule 4-501(3) (c), U.C.A. (1993).

Thus, the Trial Court was

mandated either to grant the hearing or alternatively make
findings that the hearing was not necessary because the motion is
frivolous or that dispositive issues have been authoritatively
decided.
In the present case, the Trial Court did not grant the
hearing.

Additionally, the Trial Court did not make findings

that the hearing was denied because of frivolity of the motion or
that the dispositive issues had been authoritatively decided.
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The Trial Court's rationale for not granting the Appellant's
hearing was expressed in the Trial Court's Ruling on Objections
to Proposed Order wherein it said
It is true that plaintiff requested oral argument when its
filed its original memorandum in opposition to the motion to
dismiss. Under Rule 4-501, plaintiff would have been
entitled to oral argument. However, plaintiff thereafter
filed a Notice to Submit for Decision that reads in full as
follows:
Plaintiff's objection to Defendants' Motion for
Dismissal filed with the Court on or near the 7th day
of April, 1993, by Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney for
Plaintiff, is now at issue and ready for decision of
the Court.
The natural interpretation of this notice that nothing
remained to be done before the court rendered a decision,
and that plaintiff had waived its right to oral argument.
The Court accordingly ruled without oral argument.
(R. 313 and 314). Such rationale is not among the grounds for
denying a requested hearing.

Thus, the Trial Court abused its

discretion in granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss without
holding the requested hearing.
The Trial Court did not provide Appellant with notice of
whether the hearing was denied or granted.

Rule 4-501(3) (d)

states
when a request for a hearing is denied, the court shall
notify the requesting party. When a request for a hearing
is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or
notify the requesting party that the matter shall be heard
and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
Rule 4-501(3) (d), U.C.A. (1993).

In the present case, the Trial

Court never notified Appellant that its request for a hearing was
denied.

Additionally, the Trial Court did not notify Appellant

that the matter would be heard.

Consequently, the trial court

failed to follow the very rules which govern judicial
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administration in the State of Utah.
these rules is an abuse of discretion.

Clearly, failure to follow
Therefore, Appellant

requests this Court to vacate the Trial Court's grant of
Appellees' Motion to Dismiss and remand this case back to the
trial court for further proceedings.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN INTERPRETING
RULE 4-501 OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION BY
FAILING TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES WHICH APPELLANT SUBMITTED PRIOR TO
THE COURT RULING OF APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO PROSECUTE.
The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in its

interpretation of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

Specifically, the Trial Court erred when it

ruled that Rule 4-501 precludes a party from submitting
supplemental memoranda in reply to a Motion to Dismiss.

(R.

173). Because the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of Rule
4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, this Court
must reverse the Trial Court's grant of Appellees' Motions for
Summary Judgment and remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
There is nothing in Rule 4-501 which precludes filing
supplemental memoranda.

In fact, the plain language of the rule

expressly provides for the filing of supplemental memoranda.
Rule 4-501(1) (a), in the relevant part states,

"All motions . .

. shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and
authorities."

Thus, the Rule initially sets out a minimum

requirement of at least one memorandum of points and authorities.
Rule 4-501(1) (a) then goes on to expressly contemplate the
37

filing of more than one memorandum of points and authorities
along with a single motion, "Memoranda supporting or opposing a
motion shall not exceed ten pages in length . . . "
501(1) (a), U.C.A. (1993).

Rule 4-

This sentence expressly uses the

plural of Memorandum while referring to a single motion.

Thus,

the plain language of this section of the rule permits filing
more than one memoranda supporting or opposing a motion to
dismiss.
Appellant asserts that this reading of the statute is
bolstered by the language used in other subsections of this rule.
For instance, Rule 4-501(3) (b) states,
In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the
action . . . either party at the time of filing the
principal motion in support or in opposition to a motion may
file a written request for a hearing.
Rule 4-501(3) (b), U.C.A. (1993).

Thus, the rule seems to

expressly contemplate that more than one memoranda may accompany
a single motion.

Additionally, there is clearly nothing in Rule

4-501 which precludes filing more than one memorandum in support
or opposition of a motion.

Therefore, the Trial Court erred as a

matter of law when it interpreted Rule 4-501 as precluding the
filing of supplemental memorandum and therefore did not consider
Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum in ruling on Appellees'
Motions to Dismiss.

Because the Trial Court erred as a matter of

law, this Court must reverse the Trial Court and remand this case
back for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court abused its discretion by proceeding in this
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matter despite its acknowledgement that the Appellees failed to
comply with the terms of Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

The Trial Court abused its discretion by

granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss because Appellant did not
engage in dilatory conduct worthy of such a dismissal.

The Trial

Court further abused its discretion in granting the Appellees'
Motions to Dismiss where Appellant had engaged new counsel who
had reactivated the case.

The Trial Court abused its discretion

by failing to hold the hearing and oral argument requested by the
Appellant pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration.

Finally, the Trial Court erred as a matter of

law in interpreting Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.
Because the Trial Court abused its discretion, and to right
the injustice that has resulted from that abuse, this Court must
vacate the Trial Court's decision and remand this case to the
Trial Court for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / o

day of November, 1993.

STEVEN C. TYCKSEN

StdVeh C. Tycksen
Attorney for Appellant
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 10

Rule 10, Form of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All pleadings and other papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth
the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, the name of the
pleading or other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge to whom the
case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall include the
names of all the parties, but other pleadings and papers need only state the
name of the first party on each side with an indication that there are other
parties. A party whose name is not known shall be designated by any name
and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown
parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in
the subject matter of the action." Every pleading and other paper filed with
the court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and bar number of any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which information
shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first page. Every pleading shall
state the name and address of the party for whom it is filed; this information
shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading.
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense
shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances;
and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings.
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be
adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another
pleading, or in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all
purposes.
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and other papers filed with the court, except printed documents or other exhibits, shall be
typewritten, printed or photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed
paper of letter size (8 W x 11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 inches
above any typed material, a left-hand margin of not less than 1 inch, a righthand margin of not less than one-half inch, and a bottom margin of not less
than one-half inch. All typing or printing shall be clearly legible, ^shall be
double-spaced, except for matters customarily single-spaced or indented, and
shall not be smaller than pica size. Typing or printing shall appear on one side
of the page only.
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under all signature
lines, and all signatures shall be made in permanent black or blue ink.
(f) Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk of the
court shall examine all pleadings and other papers filed with the court. If they
are not prepared in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing
but may require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers for nonconforming papers. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements of this
rule for parties appearing pro se. For good cause shown, the court may relieve
any party of any requirement of this rule.
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper
filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or
without notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the
original.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1983; April 1, 1990.)
Advisory Committee Note. — As a general
matter, Rule 10 deals with the form of papers
filed with the court — both "pleadings" as defined in Rule 7(a) and "other papers filed with
the court," including motions, memoranda, discovery responses, and orders. The changes in
the present rule were promulgated to clarify

ambiguities in the prior rule and to address
specific problems encountered by the courts.
Paragraphs (b), (c) and (e) of the rule were not
changed, except that paragraph (e) was redesignated as (g) and new paragraphs (e) and (0
were added.
Paragraph (a). This paragraph specifies re-
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ner, there was no abuse in the district court's
denial of plaintiffs second motion. Hill v.
Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Need.
Where the defendant's counsel had three
weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the
.,
* *
, ,, .' «* * *. uwitnesses, purportedly important to his case,
were actually present at trial and
thus subject
COLLATERAL
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance
§ 1 et seq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 76, 80, 83,
84.
C.J.S. — 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.;
88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35.
A.L.R. — Admissions to prevent continuance sought to secure testimony of absent wit-
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to cross-examination, the purely speculative
need for a third witness did not entitle the defendant to the granting of a motion for continuance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109
(Utah 1985).
-,., , . m, ,
™ ,
cnn n « j ™n
Cited in Thorley v. Thorley, 579 P.2d 927
(Utah 1978).
J
J
REFERENCES
ness in civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272.
Continuance of civil case as conditioned
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.
Ke
Y Numbers. — Continuance «=» 1 et seq.;
Trial <s=> 1 to 7.

Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For, failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order Of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
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Rule 41

pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at
the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has
complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained.
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (<i)
of this rule are substantially similar to Rule
41, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Costs of previously dismissed action.
—Attorney fees.
Counterclaim.
—Lack of prosecution.
Involuntary dismissal.
—Appeal.
-Standard of review.
Time limits.
—Directed verdict distinguished.
Findings and conclusions.
—Effect.
—Evidence to be considered.
—Federal rules.
—Grounds.
Failure to establish prima facie case.
Failure to join indispensable party.
Failure to prosecute.
Failure to replace counsel.
Insufficient evidence.
Lack of jurisdiction.
—Improper venue distinguished.
—Procedure.
—Reinstatement of dismissed count.
—Water appropriation cases.
Voluntary dismissal.
—Action pending in another state.
—Conditions.
Payment of attorney's fees.
—Court's discretion.
—Laches.
—Two-dismissal rule.
Second dismissal.
Quashing of previous summons.
Cited.
Costs of previously dismissed action.
—Attorney fees.
Imposition of attorney fees as condition precedent to permitting filing of fourth amended
complaint was not error. Tebbs & Tebbs v
Oliveto, 123 Utah 158, 256 P.2d 699 (1953).
Counterclaim.
—Lack of prosecution.
Where, in cause of action arising in 1956, th^
trial court's judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court in 1968 and the cause remandecl

for a new trial, but neither party filed any
pleading after remand until 1975, at which
time plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaim for lack of prosecution, the
trial court acted within its discretion in granting the motion. Reliance Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Caine, 555 P.2d 276 (Utah 1976).
Involuntary dismissal.
—Appeal.
Standard of review.
In reviewing a dismissal which is granted
against a plaintiff, the court must review all of
the evidence, together with every logical inference which may fairly be drawn therefrom, in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Martin
v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747 (1952).
When a trial court has made findings and
entered judgment thereon, it is the appellate
court's duty to review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the findings, which must be
allowed to stand if reasonable minds could
agree with them. Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R.,
3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 335 (1955); Child v.
Hayward, 16 Utah 2d 351, 400 P.2d 758 (1965).
Where the trial court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff
had failed to show any right to relief but no
findings of fact as authorized by Subdivision
(b) were made, the question on appeal was
whether the plaintiffs evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to him, showed
that he was entitled to relief. Davis v. Payne &
Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960).
Where the trial court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss and elected to make findings
as authorized by Subdivision (b), review of the
evidence on appeal would be in the light most
favorable to the findings. Petty v. Gindy Mfg.
Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30 (1965);
Petrie v. General Contracting Co., 17 Utah 2d
408, 413 P.2d 600 (1966).
In reviewing involuntary dismissals, the appellate court must give great weight to the
findings made and the inferences drawn by the
trial judge, but must reject his findings if
clearly erroneous. On the other hand, it does
not defer to conclusions of law but reviews
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Rule 103-4

(J) Failure to Register. Attorneys who do not register with the court, who
foil to pay the required fee on an annual basis, or who otherwise fail to notify
*he court of their intentions shall receive notice via certified mail at their lastknown address from the clerk of court that their right to practice in this court
^ 1 be summarily suspended if they do not comply with the registration
jeouirements within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such notice. Attorneys
go suspended shall be ineligible to practice in this court until their memberjjjjp has been reinstated under such terms as the court may direct, including
application and payment of any delinquent registration fees and payment of
guch additional amount as the court may direct.

Rule 103-3. Attorneys — Appearances by Attorneys.
(a) Attorney of Record. The filing of any pleading, unless otherwise specified, shall constitute an appearance by the person who signs such pleading,
and such person shall be considered counsel or party pro se of record in that
matter. If an attorney's appearance has not been established previously by the
filing of papers in the action or proceeding, such attorney shall file with the
derk a notice of appearance promptly upon undertaking the representation of
any party or witness in any court or grand jury proceedings. The form of such
notice shall follow the example included in these rules as Appendix A. An
attorney of record shall be deemed responsible in all matters before and after
judgment until the time for appeal from a judgment has expired or a judgment
has become final after appeal or until there has been a formal withdrawal
from or substitution in the case.
(b) Notification of Clerk. In all cases, counsel and parties appearing pro
se shall notify the clerk's office of any change in address or telephone number.
(c) Appearance by Party. Whenever a party has appeared by an attorney,
that party cannot appear or act thereafter in its own behalf in the action or
take any steps therein unless an order of substitution first shall have been
made by the court after notice to the attorney of each such party and to the
opposing party. However, notwithstanding that such party has appeared or is
represented by an attorney, at its discretion the court may hear a party in
open court. The attorney who has appeared of record for any party shall
(1) represent such party in the action;
(2) be recognized by the court and by all parties to the action as having
control of the client's case; and
(3) sign all papers that are to be signed on behalf of the client.

Rule 103-4. Withdrawal or Removal of Attorney.
(a) Withdrawal and Substitution. No attorney shall be permitted to withdraw or be substituted as attorney of record in any pending action except by
written application and by order of the court. All applications for withdrawal
•tall set forth the reasons therefor, together with the name, address, and
telephone number of the client, as follows:
(1) With Client's Consent. Where the withdrawing attorney has obtained the written consent of the client, such consent shall be submitted
with the application and shall be accompanied by a separate proposed
written order and may be presented to the court ex parte. The withdrawing attorney shall give prompt notice of the entry of such order to the
client and to all other parties or their attorneys. For attorneys representing the United States or any agency thereof, it shall not be necessary for
the client's signature to appear on the application provided that the client's consent to the withdrawal and substitution of counsel is acknowledged by counsel for all parties.
(2) Without Client's Consent. Where the withdrawing attorney has not
obtained the written consent of the client, the application shall be in the
form of a motion that shall be served upon the client and all other parties
or their attorneys. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate of the
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Rule 4-501

the decision. Judicial review shall be governed by the procedures set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l5.
fended effective January 15,1990; April 15,1991; January 1,1992; Febru-

£2,

1993.)

yimendment Notes. — The 1990 amend, a business or corporation, a statement that the
^ t renumbered this rule, formerly Rule business or corporation" to the introductory
^405; added the phrase beginning "and to" un. language of paragraph (C) and made stylistic
# "Applicability'; added "Upon initial applu c h a n g e s ; reWrote Subdivision (2) to delete lanirfon, and thereafter to the beginning of Sub- ^ ^ relating t 0 appraisals and inserted "pre^ o n (1); m Subdivision (1)(C) inserted the p a r e d b y a certified public accountant"; redes^ v i s i o n designation (1) and added Subdm. j M former S u b d i v i s i o n ( 2 ) ( C ) a s p r e s e n t
*"» <"• ^
o ufeS'^lfre,f
Subdivision (3), added present Subdivision (4),
jBbdivision (1XD) as Subdivisxon l)(C)(xni): a n d renunlbered t h e r e m a i n i n g subdivisions
—Animated former Subdivision (1)(E) as Sub_,. ,
,.
.",
r
S ( D ( D ) ; redesignated former Subdivi. a ' c o r d m e * making appropriate reference
1
S
(1XF) through (J) as Subdivision, S f T f ^ K »
^ f ^
^ T ^
J g w i i ) through (xii) and in Subdivision (3) ' ?,?let*d l^e**efoTe
*?**?* s t a t e ,;
ment
a d
25i) substituted "existing in Utah or any
» substituted surety for company
L
T r state" for "in any court of the state"; m t h e first sentence and substituted the
JSed Subdivisions (2)(A) through (C), (3), (4), v a l u e " f o r "a r a t i o o f b o n d d o l l a r s t o l e t t e r o f
god (5)(A) and the first two sentences in Subdi. c r e d l t dollars" in the second sentence; in
vision (5)(B), making former Subdivision (3) Present Subdivision (5), substituted "current
the third sentence in present Subdivision assets" for "real assets" in two places; and re(5KB); deleted former Subdivision (4), provide wrote present Subdivision (6) to delete a table
tag for full faith and credit among courts fo*- setting out the ratio of bond dollars outstandirders qualifying sureties; redesignated former ing to net worth value.
Subdivisions (5) through (7) as Subdivisions
The 1992 amendment substituted "Commer(5XC) and (D) and (6); substituted "circuit" for cial" for "qualifications of in the rule heading,
'court" in Subdivision (5)(C); substituted "pre- inserted "re-qualification and disqualification"
riding judge" for "court" in two places in Subdi- and "commercial" in the Intent section, and
fision (5)(D); substituted "March 1st" for "Feb- substantially rewrote the rule,
luary 28th" in Subdivision (6); added Subdi viThe 1993 amendment, effective February 1,
lion (7); and made stylistic changes through- 1993, in Subdivision (6) added the designation
art.
(A), deleted "the lesser of $500,000 or" after
The 1991 amendment in Subdivision (1) "exceed" in Subdivision (A), and added Subdivided "or if the statement is made on behalf of vision (B).

Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record.
Intent:
To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy;
aalem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City.
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any
object matter jurisdiction may hold <>ourt in any location designated by this
*ule.
(Added effective January 1, 1992.)

ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions,
latent:
To establish a uniform procedure fo>- filing motions, supporting memoranda
*&& documents with the court.

Rule 4-501
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To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims department of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applies
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has
been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after
that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a
detailed description is impracticable.
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of

the proposed order" following "supporting documentation" m Subdivision (l)(b) and made related stylistic changes and inserted "principal"
m Subdivision (3)(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
When rule applies
Cited
w.
,.
When rule applies.
Because the defendants'Rule 56(e> objection
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff

should have been given ten days to respond, as
prescribed by Subdivision (1Kb) of this rule.
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531
(Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State
Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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Principal Amount of Judgment,
Attorneys' Fees
Exclusive of Costs, Between:
Allowed
1,500.01
2,000.00
325.00
2,000.01
2,500.00
400.00
2,500.01
3,000.00
475.00
3,000.01
3,500.00
550.00
3,500.01
4,000.00
625.00
4,000.01
4,500.00
700.00
4,500.01
5,000.00
775.00
(2) Reference to this rule and the amount of attorneys' fees allowed pursu.
ant to paragraph (1) shall be stated with particularity in the body or prayer of
the complaint.
(3) When a statute provides the basis for the award of attorneys' fees, reference to the statutory authority shall be included in the complaint.
(4) Clerks may enter civil default judgments which include attorneys' fees
awarded pursuant to this rule.
(5) Attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this rule may be augmented after
judgment pursuant to Rule 4-505. When the court considers a motion for
augmentation of attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this rule, it shall consider the attorneys' time spent prior to the entry of judgment, the amount of
attorneys' fees included in the judgment, and the statements contained in the
affidavit supporting the motion for augmentation.
(6) Prior to entry of a judgment which grants attorneys' fees pursuant to
this rule, any party may move the court to depart from the fees allowed by
paragraph (1) of this rule. Such application shall be made pursuant to Rule
4-505.
(7) If a contract or other document provides for an award of attorneys' fees,
an original or copy of the document shall be made a part of the file before
attorneys' fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule.
(8) No affidavit for attorneys' fees need be filed in order to receive an award
of attorneys' fees pursuant to this rule.
(Added effective March 31, 1992.)

Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in
civil cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in trial courts of
record except guardians ad litem and court-appointed counsel.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney may
withdraw as counsel of record without the approval of the court except when
(a) a motion has been filed and is pending before the court or (b) a certificate of
readiness for trial has been filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney may
not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court.
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, written notice of the
withdrawal must be served upon the client of the withdrawing attorney and
upon all other parties not in default and a certificate of service must be filed
with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal served
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial date.
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from
the case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify, i n
writing, the unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to retain another
attorney or appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate further

lings against the client. A copy of the written notice shall be filed with
E t f u r t and no further proceedings shall be held in the matter until 20 days
elapsed from the date of filing,
fended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.)
^Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendJ ^ added "Consistent with the Rules of ProS o n a l Conduct" to Subdivision (1) and, in
Sjivision (3), inserted "in writing" in the
JJtsentence and added the second sentence,
<flie 1991 amendment, in the Applicability
action, substituted the present language for

'This rule shall apply to all trial courts of
record and not of record"; and in Subdivision
(1) substituted the present language beginning
with "without the approval of the court" for "in
all cases except for withdrawal would result in
delay of trial. In that case, an attorney may not
withdraw without the approval of the court."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Rule 4-507, Disposition of funds on trustee's sale.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee affidavits of deposit and
claimant petitions for adjudication of priority in trustee's sales.
To establish a uniform procedure in determining the disposition of funds on
trustee's sales.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the Court any proceeds from
a trustee's sale in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the
trustee shall file an affidavit with the clerk setting forth the facts of the
deposit and a list of all known claimants, including known addresses. The
clerk shall notify the listed claimants within 10 days of receiving the affidavit
of deposit.
(2) Any claimant may then file a petition for adjudication of priority to
these funds and request a hearing before the court. The petitioner requesting
the hearing shall give notice of the hearing to all claimants listed in the
trustee's affidavit of deposit and any others known to the petitioner. All persons having or claiming an interest must appear and assert their claim or be
barred thereafter.
(3) Pursuant to the determination hearing, the court will establish the
priorities of the parties to the trustee's sale proceeds and enter an order with
the clerk of the court or county treasurer directing the disbursement of funds
as determined.

Rule 4-508. Unpublished opinions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform standard for the use of unpublished opinions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record.
Statement of the Rule:
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value
and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for purposes of
applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
(Added effective January 15, 1990.)
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cause, by filing a notice of withdrawal. Such notice shall state (a)
date of entry of final decree or judgment, (b) the last known address
of such party, (c) that such attorney withdraws as attorney for such
party. A copy of such notice shall be mailed to such party at his last
known address and shall be served upon the adverse party.
(Added by Stats.1963, c. 1333, p. 2856, § 1. Amended by Stats.1969, c.
1608, p. 3344, § 10, operative Jan. 1,1970.)
Historical Note
The 1969 amendment substituted in the
first sentence "dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or for a declaration of
void or voidable marriage" for "divorce,
separate , maintenance or annulment."

Operative date of Stats.1969, c. 1608,
see Historical Note under § 125.

Forms
See West's California Code Forms, Civil Procedure.

Law Review Commentaries
Background and general effect of 1963
addition. (1963) 38 S. Bar J. 661.

Library References
Attorney and Client <§=>76(1).
C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 221, 231.

Family Law Practice, Goddard, §§ 589,
590.

Notes of Decisions
In general I
Appearance In propria persona 2
Finality of judgment 3

I. In general
Client can discharge attorney of record
at any time and substitute another in his
place, but to do so he must conform to §§
284, 285 and this section. Forslund v.
Forslund (1964) 37 Cal.Rptr. 489. 225 C.
A.2d 476.
2. Appearance in propria persona
Where party who has appeared in action by attorney thereafter takes part in
proceedings in propria persona without

§ 286.

following procedure prescribed in §§ 284
and 285 for discharge of attorney, service
of subsequent pleadings are nevertheless
properly made on attorney. Forslund v.
Forslund (1964) 37 Cal.Rptr. 489, 225 C.
A.2d 476.
3. Finality of judgment
While authority of attorney ordinarily
ends with entry of judgment, except for
purpose of enforcing it or having it set
aside or reversed, judgment of divorce, insofar as it relates to custody and maintenance of minor children, is not final but
litigation is regarded as still pending and
service may yet be made on attorney.
Forslund v. Forslund (1964) 37 Cal.Rptr.
489, 225 C.A.2d 476.

Death, removal, etc.; new appointment or appearance in
person
When an attorney dies, or is removed or suspended, or ceases to
act as such, a party to an action, for whom he was acting as attorney, must, before any further proceedings are had against him, be re564

Title 5
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§ 286

quired by the adverse party, by written notice, to appoint another attorney, or to appear in person.
(Enacted 1872. Amended by Code Am.1880, c. 35, p. 57, § 1.)
Historical Note
The reenactraent of 1880 changed only
the punctuation.

Forms
See West's California Code Forms, Civil Procedure.

Cross References
Suspension or removal of attorney, see Business and Professions Code § 6100 et seq.

Library References
Attorney and Client <§=>75. 76.

C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 231.
Notes of Decisions

In general I
Limitation of actions 7
Personal appearance by party 4
Power of the court 3
Purpose 2
Representation by other counsel
Suspension or removal of attorney
Waiver of notice 8

1. In general
This section applies only when attorney
has died or ceased to be attorney and not
when he ceased to act for his client in
particular case. California Water Service
Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc.
(1964) 37 Cal.Rptr. 1, 224 C.A.2d 715.
This section does not apply where attorney has ceased to act for client in particular case. Gion v. Stroud (1961) 12 Cal.
Rptr. 540, 191 C.A^d 277.
The phrase "ceases to act as such," as
used in this section providing that, when
an attorney ceases to act as such, party
for whom he was acting as attorney must
be required by adverse party by written
notice to appoint another attorney or appear in person, contemplates that notice
be given when attorney ceases to practice
as an attorney rather than when he ceases to act as an attorney in a particular
piece of litigation. Jones v. Green (1946)
168 P.2d 418, 74 C.A 2d 223.
2.

Purpose
Purpose of this section is to provide notice to a party who might otherwise be
taken unawares. California Water Service Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc.
(1964) 37 Cal.Rptr. 1, 224 C.A.2d 715.

3. Power of the court
If defendant's attorney exhibits objective evidence of physical incapacity to
proceed with meaningful defense of client,
such as illness, intoxication, or nervous
breakdown, court should inquire into matter on its own motion and if necessary relieve affected counsel and order a substitution; yet even that action should be taken
with great circumspection and after all
reasonable alternatives, such as granting
of continuance, have been exhausted; failure to observe these standards will compel
reversal of ensuing judgment; and this result will follow regardless of whether
substituted counsel was competent or
whether defendant received "fair trial".
Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
Countv (1968) 68 Cal.Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d
65, 68 C.A. 547.
Under this section trial court, in absence of written notice requiring defendant
to appoint another attorney after his
original attorney has ceased to act, and in
absence of defendant or any attorney, was
without authority to proceed with the
trial. McMunn v. Lehrke (1915) 155 P.
473. 29 C.A. 298.
Though this section provides that, when
an attornev dies, a party to an action, for
whom he was acting, must be required by
the adverse party, by written notice, to
appoint another attorney, or appear in
person, before any further proceedings
are had against him, failure of a defendant to give such notice to a plaintiff
whose attorney had died will not deprive
the court of jurisdiction to dismiss an action for want of prosecution where plaintiff appointed another attorney before the
commencement of the proceedings. Xicol
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